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As data-driven methods are deployed in real-world settings, the processes that
generate the observed data will often react to the decisions of the learner. For
example, a data source may have some incentive for the algorithm to provide
a particular label (e.g. approve a bank loan), and manipulate their features ac-
cordingly. Work in strategic classification and decision-dependent distributions
seeks to characterize the closed-loop behavior of deploying learning algorithms by
explicitly considering the effect of the classifier on the underlying data distribution.
More recently, works in performative prediction seek to classify the closed-loop
behavior by considering general properties of the mapping from classifier to data
distribution, rather than an explicit form. Building on this notion, we analyze
repeated risk minimization as the perturbed trajectories of the gradient flows of
performative risk minimization. We consider the case where there may be multiple
local minimizers of performative risk, motivated by real world situations where
the initial conditions may have significant impact on the long-term behavior of the
system. As a motivating example, we consider a company whose current employee
demographics affect the applicant pool they interview: the initial demographics
of the company can affect the long-term hiring policies of the company. We pro-
vide sufficient conditions to characterize the region of attraction for the various
equilibria in this settings. Additionally, we introduce the notion of performative
alignment, which provides a geometric condition on the convergence of repeated
risk minimization to performative risk minimizers.
1 Introduction
Data-driven methods are growing increasingly popular in practice. Most classical machine learning
and statistical methods view the underlying process which generates the data as fixed: the study is
primarily focused on the mapping from data distributions to classifier. However, it is important to
consider the effects in the other direction as well: how does the classifier chosen by a learner change
the data distribution the learner sees? In particular, how do we close the loop around machine learning
deployments in practice?
These closed loop effects can arise in many real world settings. One instance is strategic classification:
whenever a data source has a stake in which label a classifier applies to it, they will seek cost-effective
ways to manipulate their data to earn the desired label. For example, credit scoring classifiers are
heavily guarded for fear of the potential for gaming [Hardt et al., 2016]. Alternatively, deployments























processes at play. For example, a classifier that predicts crime recidivism influences the opportunities
available to individuals [Dressel and Farid, 2018].
Formally, we consider this problem in the framework introduced in Perdomo et al. [2020]. Let
`(z, x) denote the loss when the learner’s decision is x (e.g. x can be the parameters of the chosen
classifier) and the data has realized value z. Furthermore, let D(x) denote the data distribution when
the learner’s decision is x. In this framework, the performative risk is given by:
PR(x) = EZ∼D(x)[`(Z, x)] (1)
Whereas classical machine learning results treat the distribution Z ∼ D as fixed, the performative
prediction framework models the decision-dependent distribution as a mapping D(·). However,
in many real world-deployments, this decision-dependent distribution shift may not be explicitly
included in the learner’s updates. This leads to algorithms based on inexact repeated minimization.
Define the decoupled performative risk as:
R(x1, x2) = EZ∼D(x2)[`(Z, x1)] (2)
The decoupled performative risk R(x1, x2) separates the two ways that the decision variable x
affects the performative risk. Through the x1 argument, x affects the classification error; through
the x2 argument, x causes a decision-dependent distribution shift. In this paper, we shall analyze the
steady-state behavior of stochastic gradient descent algorithms:
xk+1 = xk − αk(∇x1R(xk, xk) + ηk) (3)
Here, (ηk)k is some zero-mean noise process. Note that the gradient is evaluated only with respect to
the first argument, i.e. the updates are based only on the effect of x on the loss function, and ignore
the distribution shift caused by x. In other words, the learner draws several observations from the
distributionD(xk), and, treating this distribution as fixed, updates their model parameters xk+1 based
on stochastic gradient descent: they are descending the gradient of the cost function y 7→ R(y, xk).
In particular, we focus on settings where there may be multiple local equilibria, and classify their
regions of attraction for these equilibria. In many settings of interest, there may be multiple steady-
state outcomes, and it is of interest to determine which outcome will be chosen by the dynamics in
Equation (3). As a motivating example, we consider a model of how a company’s demographics
can affect the pool of applications that apply for jobs at the company. In this model, the initial
demographics of the company determine the steady-state demographics of the company. Our results
allow us to characterize which regions of the parameter space will converge to which equilibria. We
discuss this example in greater formal detail in Section 3.1.
Our main theoretical results can be informally summarized as follows. Theorem 1 states that
trajectories of inexact repeated risk minimization will converge exponentially fast to a neighborhood
of local performative risk minimizers, and stay in this neighborhood for all future time. It also provides
a sufficient condition to under-approximate the regions of attraction for each local performative risk
minimizer. In the special case of vanishing perturbations, these trajectories will converge to the
minimizers themselves. As a corollary, this implies that performatively stable points will be near
performatively optimal points, which can be seen as a continuous-time analog to results proved
in Perdomo et al. [2020]. Theorem 2 states a geometric condition on the performative perturbation
which ensures that trajectories of repeated risk minimization will converge to local performative risk
minimizers, intuitively based on the idea that the perturbation does not push against convergence.
These results allow us to identify the regions of attraction for various steady-state outcomes. As
observed in Miller et al. [2021], these various outcomes can be interpreted as different echo chambers:
essentially the decision variable x can act as a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.1 In settings with
multiple echo chambers, we consider the question of which echo chamber will come to dominate,
based on the initialization of the learner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related literature. In
Section 3, we introduce the problem statement and the mathematical concepts used for our results, and
1It is worth noting that we take a slightly different interpretation of an ‘echo chamber’ in this paper. In Miller
et al. [2021], the echo chambers are defined as performatively stable points. In this paper, we consider the
regions near each locally performatively optimal point as an echo chamber. As we will discuss in Section 3.1,
we are interested in settings where there may be many local performative risk minimizers that attract learning
methods depending on initialization.
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provide a motivating example based on job applicant pools in Section 3.1. In section 4, we analyze
the gradient flow associated with performative risk minimization, and in Section 5, we analyze the
flows associated with repeated risk minimization. We demonstrate numerical results in Section 6, and
provide closing remarks in Section 7.
2 Background
There has been a great deal of interest in studying decision-dependent distributions. In the context of
operations research, this has been studied under either the name decision-dependent uncertainty or
endogenous uncertainty. In Jonsbråten et al. [1998], Jonsbråten [1998], and Goel and Grossmann
[2004], the authors considered oil field optimization, with a framework that captures how information
revelation can be affected by one’s decisions. In Peeta et al. [2010], the authors consider infrastructure
investment, and how investments can affect the future likelihood of disasters. For a taxonomy of the
work in the operations research community, we refer the reader to Hellemo et al. [2018].
Another form of decision-dependent distributions is strategic classification. In these works, the data
source is seen as a utility-maximizing agent. The distribution shift resulting from the learner’s decision
is modeled by a best response function. In Hardt et al. [2016] and Brückner and Scheffer [2011], the
authors formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game where the data source responds to the announced
classifier. In Dong et al. [2018], the authors consider when the data source’s preferences are hidden
information and provide sufficient conditions for convexity of the overall strategic classification task.
In Akyol et al. [2016], the authors quantify the cost of strategic classification for the classifier. In Milli
et al. [2019] and Hu et al. [2019], the authors note that certain groups may be disproportionately
affected as institutions incorporate methods to counter data sources gaming the classifier. In Miller
et al. [2020], the authors formulate strategic classification in a causal framework.
Most related to our work is recent efforts in performative prediction. This was introduced in [Perdomo
et al., 2020]. In this formulation, rather than explicitly modeling the form of the distribution shift, it
proposes to analyze the decision-dependent distribution shift in terms of general properties of theD(·)
mapping, where D(x) is the distribution of the data when the learner’s decision is x. In Perdomo et al.
[2020], the authors introduced the concepts related to performative prediction, demonstrated that
neither the performatively stable nor performatively optimal points are subsets of each other, provided
sufficient conditions for exact repeated risk minimization (defined as finding the exact minima with
respect to D(xk) at each time step) to converge, and provided conditions in which performatively
stable points are near performatively optimal points. In Mendler-Dünner et al. [2020], the authors
analyze inexact repeated risk minimization (defined as an update step with respect to D(xk) at each
time step) from a stochastic optimization framework. In this paper, we build on the inexact repeated
risk minimization framework. Miller et al. [2021] provided sufficient conditions for performative
risk itself to be convex. Brown et al. [2020] extended these results to settings where the distribution
updates may have an internal state. In Drusvyatskiy and Xiao [2020], the authors show that many
inexact repeated risk minimization algorithms will also converge nicely, due to the way in which the
performative perturbation decays near the solution. This shares many ideas with our work here, but
we focus on the case where there may be multiple attractive equilibria, and generalize to settings
where the perturbation itself may not vanish. In contrast to previous works which provide sufficient
conditions to guarantee that an outcome is approached globally, we focus on understanding local
regions of attraction for various outcomes.
This work draws on ideas from control theory; in particular, the analysis of gradient flows, Lyapunov
functions, and perturbation analysis are the tools we use throughout. We refer the reader to Hirsch
et al. [2012] and Khalil [2001] as good references for these suite of tools.
3 Performative prediction, flows, and perturbations
In this section, we introduce the mathematical concepts used throughout this paper. As previously
mentioned, the framework used throughout this paper builds on the framework of performative
prediction, introduced in Perdomo et al. [2020].
In Section 1, we have already defined the performative risk in Equation (1) and the decoupled per-
formative risk in Equation (2). Furthermore, we say that x is a local performative risk minimizer
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is x is a local minima of PR(·). We say x is locally performatively stable if x is a local minima of
y 7→ R(y, x). In general, neither imply the other [Perdomo et al., 2020].
Additionally, we consider the performative risk minimizing (PRM) gradient flow, defined by the
following differential equation:
ẋPR = −∇PR(xPR) = −∇x1R(xPR, xPR)−∇x2R(xPR, xPR) =: fPR(xPR) (4)
This vector field can be represented by the gradient of a function, which lends the flow to nice
analysis. Under mild conditions, the trajectories of Equation (4) will converge to local minima of the
performative risk.
However, as noted in Section 1, many deployments of machine learning do not explicitly model the
distribution shift, and, consequently, do not directly minimize the performative risk. We define the
repeated risk minimizing (RRM) flow as solutions to the differential equation:
ẋRR = −∇x1R(xRR, xRR) =: fRR(xRR) (5)
We define the performative perturbation:
g(x) := ∇x2R(x, x) = fRR(x)− fPR(x)
In this paper, we view the PRM gradient flow as the nominal dynamics, and the RRM flow as the
perturbed dynamics. The PRM gradient flow has nice properties arising from the fact it is a gradient
flow, and, under certain conditions on the performative perturbation, we can prove properties about
the RRM flow, which is the quantity of interest. In particular, we show ultimate bounds on the
distance between the trajectories of RRM flow and the local performative risk minimizers. This also
implies that under certain conditions on the performative risk, all performatively stable points are
near performative risk minimizers, as was observed in Perdomo et al. [2020].
Throughout this paper, we will be using tools from perturbation analysis in control theory. For a
complete vector field ẋ = f(x), let ϕf (·;x0) denote the unique solution to the differential equation
with initial condition x(0) = x0. For a scalar-valued function V and a vector field f , we can define
the derivative along trajectories as LfV (x) = ∂V∂x f(x). We say a point x is an equilibrium point if
f(x) = 0. An equilibrium point x is locally asymptotically stable if there exists a neighborhood
U 3 x such that limt→∞ ϕf (t;x′) = x for all x′ ∈ U . A set A is positively invariant if for all
x0 ∈ A and t ≥ 0, we have ϕf (t;x0) ∈ A. Additionally, given a set A ⊂ Rn, we say two points
x and y are path-connected in A if there exists a continuous function γ : [0, 1] → A such that
γ(0) = x and γ(1) = y. This forms an equivalence relation defined on A, and each equivalence class
is a connected component of A.
3.1 A motivating example: decision-dependent distribution shift in job applicant pools
Before we present our analysis of the PRM gradient flow and the RRM flow, we introduce a motivating
example which motivates the study of multiple local equilibria. This toy example considers a model
for decision-dependent distribution shift in the applicant pool for a job based on the past hiring
decisions of a company.
In this model, individuals are characterized by three variables: 1) their group membership, θ ∈ {0, 1},
2) y ∼ N(0, 1), which is their true productive capacity and independent of their group membership
θ, and 3) ŷ ∼ N(y, σ2), their observable productivity, which is a distorted version of their true
productive capacity. The distribution of θ in the applicant pool will be decision-dependent, which we
shall specify shortly. We let z = (θ, ŷ, y), which is viewed as observable features (θ, ŷ) and output y.
A learner wants to use historical hiring data to determine which individuals to hire into their company.
The variable of interest is y, which is the individual’s true productive capacity. The learner must
make the decision based on (θ, ŷ), and can observe y after the fact. We assume the learner uses a
linear classifier. Let f(θ, ŷ;x) = xb + xθθ + xŷ ŷ, and the individual with observable features (θ, ŷ)
is hired if f(θ, ŷ;x) ≥ 0. We also assume the learner uses a logistic loss function:
`(z, x) = log(1 + exp(−yf(θ, ŷ;x)))
Now, let us define the decision-dependent distribution shift D(x). In our model, if group θ = 1 has
insufficient representation among the hired population, then future rounds will have fewer applications
4



































































































Figure 1: The population and classifier across time. On the left, we see an initialization that favors
group 1. After 300 iterations, we see that the classifier converges to primarily only using the ŷ feature,
and that group 1 is still represented in the applicant pool. On the right, we see an initialization that
is unfavorable to group 1. After 300 iterations, the classifier still converges and ignores the group
membership, but the participation of group 1 in the applicant pool has dwindled.
from this group. Furthermore, if group θ = 1 is well-represented in the hired population, then this
encourages this group to apply in the future. We suppose there is some critical fraction pc: if less
than pc of the hired population is of group 1, the next applicant pool will have reduced participation
by group 1; if the hired population has group 1 represented by more than pc, then the next applicant
pool will have increased participation up to a saturation fraction p.
Formally, this means we define D(x) as follows. The distributions of y and ŷ do not depend on x.
Let p denote the fraction of the applicant pool that was group 1 in the previous iteration, and let q
denote the fraction of the previously accepted applicants which was group 1. The group membership
θ ∼ Bernoulli(p+), where p+ is given by:2
p+ = median(0, p, p− βq(q − pc)(q − p)) (6)
This update rule decreases p for q ∈ (0, pc) and increases p for q ∈ (pc, p).
We show numerical some of the results in Figure 1. In this example, we set the critical fraction as
pc = 0.3, the saturation fraction p = 0.5, and the observation variance σ2 = (0.8)2. We initialized
p = pc = 0.3, and, at each iteration k, the dataset was redrawn with 100 samples from D(xk). In
this model, since θ is uncorrelated with the quantity of interest y, we see the classifier converges to a
vertical line which ignores the group membership θ in both cases. However, in the initialization that
2We note that, technically, this formulation requires the D mapping have some notion of ‘state’, since the
next distribution depends on not only x but the fraction of the previous applicant pool p and accepted applicants
q. Such extensions have been considered generally in Brown et al. [2020], but, for this example, it suffices to
add p and q as components of x and z, since both quantities are known by the learner.
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is unfavorable to group 1, we see a dwindling participation by group 1, even though the classifier
after 300 iterations is relatively fair.3
This model motivates the study of regions of attraction for different equilibria. Our results can identify
the region of attraction for different outcomes. A company for one reason or another may have
historically hired more from one group of individuals than another. This example shows that when
there are decision-dependent distribution shifts, the initial conditions can affect the final outcomes. In
particular, for this setting, it is of interest to identify the region of convergence for different equilibria.
4 Analysis of performative risk minimizing gradient flow
In this section, we consider PRM gradient flow, defined by Equation (4). We observe that gradient
flows provide complete vector fields, and that trajectories will converge to local performative risk
minimizers under very mild conditions.
First, we state a proposition guaranteeing that flow is well-defined. The compact sublevel sets ensure
that trajectories of Equation (4) remain bounded, which is sufficient to guarantee existence and
uniqueness of solutions globally. For proof of the following proposition, we refer the reader to
either Khalil [2001, Section 3.1] or Hirsch et al. [2012, Section 9.3].
Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness of gradient flows). Suppose the performative risk PR(·)
is continuously differentiable, and its sublevel sets {x : PR(x) ≤ c} are compact for every c ∈ R.
Then for any initial condition xPR(0) = x0, there exists a unique solution to the differential equation
in Equation (4), defined for all t ≥ 0.
Next, we note that gradient flows have nice properties from the perspective of optimization. Namely:
every isolated local minima is locally asymptotically stable, and we can provide sufficient conditions
to characterize a subset of the region of convergence.
Proposition 2 (Convergence of gradient flows). Suppose the performative risk PR(·) is twice
continuously differentiable, and x∗ is an isolated local performative risk minimizer. Then x∗ is
a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of Equation (4). Furthermore, take any c such that
PR(x∗) ≤ c. Let A ⊆ {x : PR(x) ≤ c} denote the connected component of {x : PR(x) ≤ c}
that contains x∗. If x∗ is the only local performative minimizer in A, then all solutions with initial
conditions in A converge to x∗.
Proof. Since x∗ is an isolated local minimizer and the performative risk is twice continuously
differentiable, there exists a neighborhood U 3 x∗ such that ∇PR(·) is non-zero for all x 6= x∗.
By continuity, there exists some constant ε such that the connected component of {x : PR(x) ≤
PR(x∗)+ε} containing x∗ is contained inU . Since it is a sublevel set of PR(·) andLfPRPR(x) < 0
on its boundary, it is positively invariant. Furthermore, since LfPR(x) < 0 for all x 6= x∗ on this set,
x∗ is locally asymptotically stable by standard Lyapunov arguments (see, e.g. Khalil [2001, Section
4]).
The sublevel sets of the performative risk are positively invariant with respect to the PRM gradient
flow. Furthermore, because of the continuity of trajectories, each connected component will also
be positively invariant. This, tandem with the fact that trajectories must either converge to a local
minima or go off to infinity, also implies the previous proposition.
With minimal assumptions, isolated local performative risk minimizers are all locally attractive in the
PRM gradient flow. In Section 5, we will view the PRM gradient flow as the nominal dynamics. From
this perspective, we analyze the RRM flow as a perturbation from these nominal dynamics. To be
able to do any perturbation-based analysis, we will need some stronger conditions on the convergence
of the gradient flow associated with performative risk minimization. We note these assumptions here.
Assumption 1 (Sufficient curvature of the performative risk). Fix some isolated local performative
risk minimizer x∗. We assume there exists positive constants c1, c2, c3 and c4 such that the following
3As mentioned in the previous footnote, we augment x with p, the probability of seeing θ = 1. Thus,
although in both initialization, we see the classifier parameters are converging to the same point, with this
augmentation, we can view these as two separate equilibria. However, for ease of presentation, we avoided
cluttering notation with this augmentation.
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holds in a neighborhood of x∗:
c1|x− x∗|2 ≤ PR(x)− PR(x∗) ≤ c2|x− x∗|2 (7)
c3|x− x∗| ≤ |∇PR(x)| ≤ c4|x− x∗| (8)
We will let r denote the radius of this neighborhood, so the above inequalities are valid on the set
{x : |x− x∗| ≤ r}.
Assumption 1 provides conditions on which V (x) = PR(x)− PR(x∗) can be used as a Lyapunov
function locally.
5 Analysis of repeated risk minimizing flow
In the previous section, we consider the PRM gradient flow and showed that the trajectories converge
to local performative risk minimizers in very general settings. In this section, we will consider the
RRM flow, defined by Equation (5). The RRM flow is not necessarily a gradient flow, and generally
will not inherit the nice properties we saw in Section 4.
The following theorem provides conditions on the transient response and steady-state behavior of the
RRM flow. Prior to T , the trajectories converge exponentially quickly. After T , we have an ultimate
bound that holds.
Theorem 1 (Ultimate bounds for RRM flow). Fix any isolated performative risk minimizer x∗ and
suppose the conditions of Assumption 1 hold. Let (ci)4i=1 denote the constants from Assumption 1
and r > 0 denote the radius where the inequalities are valid.
Suppose that there exists positive constants ε < c23/c4 and δ such that the following holds on
U = {x : |x− x∗| ≤ r}:
|∇x2R(x, x)| ≤ ε|x− x∗|+ δ (9)
Additionally, suppose the initial condition satisfies:










(1− θ)r(c23/c4 − ε)
Then, there exists a T ≥ 0 such that:





exp(−tθ(c23 − c4ε)/2c2)|x0 − x∗|






(1− θ)(c23 − c4ε)
Proof. Let V (x) = R(x, x) − R(x∗, x∗). Note that V (x) ≥ 0 on U = {x : |x − x∗| ≤ r} and
V (x) = 0 if and only if x = x∗. Furthermore, note that ∂V∂x (x) = [∇x1R(x, x) +∇x2R(x, x)]
ᵀ.
Consider the function t 7→ V (ϕfRR(t;x0)) and its time derivative. Also, let xRR(t) = ϕfRR(t;x0).





(fPR(x) + g) = −|∇x1R+∇x2R|2 + 〈∇x1R+∇x2R,∇x2R〉 ≤
−c23|xRR − x∗|2 + c4|xRR − x∗||∇x2R| ≤ −c23|xRR − x∗|2 + c4ε|xRR − x∗|2 + c4δ|xRR − x∗|
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These inequalities are valid so long as xRR(t) stays within U , which we will ensure later in the proof.
Note that ε is sufficiently small (by assumption) to ensure that −c23 + c4ε < 0.
Let α := c23 − c4ε > 0. Take any θ ∈ (0, 1) and note that:
LfPR+gV (xRR) ≤ −θα|xRR − x∗|2 − (1− θ)α|xRR − x∗|2 + c4δ|xRR − x∗|
Let µ(θ) := c4δ/(1− θ)α. If |xRR − x∗| ≥ µ(θ), then:
LfPR+gV (xRR) ≤ −θα|xRR − x∗|2
Trajectories of Equation (5) has two stages: a transient due to its initial condition, and then an ultimate








The latter follows from Equation (7). By the comparison principle (see, e.g. [Khalil, 2001, Lemma
3.4]), we have V (xRR(t)) ≤ exp(−tθα/c2)V (x0). Again using Equation (7), this yields the






Note that this inequality also provides an upper bound on T (θ). Additionally, note that this implies
the bound |xRR(t)−x∗| ≤ r, by our assumption on the initial condition. Prior to T (θ), our trajectory
stays in U , where our inequalities are valid.
At time T (θ), we have |xRR(t)−x∗| ≤ µ(θ). Note that this inequality implies V (xRR(t)) ≤ c2µ2(θ).
Since LfPR+gV < 0 on the boundary of Ω(θ) := {x : V (x) ≤ c2µ2(θ)}, we have that Ω(θ) is a
positively invariant set. So, for all t ≥ T (θ), we have xRR(t) ∈ Ω(θ). Using Equation (7), we have






The condition on θ ensures that this quantity is bounded by r, and the trajectory stays in U for
t ≥ T (θ). This proves our desired result.
Note that, in the special case where δ = 0, we have that the RRM flow converges exponentially
quickly to x∗ locally. Similarly, in the special case where Assumption 1 holds everywhere (i.e.
r =∞), then there is only one minimizer x∗, and all initial conditions converge to a neighborhood of
x∗ exponentially fast.
Additionally, note that locally performatively stable points are equilibria of the RRM flow. This result
provides constraints on where performatively stable points can be. Suppose again that Assumption 1
holds globally (i.e. r =∞) and, consequently, there exists only one minimizer x∗. In this special case,
Theorem 1 shows that all performatively stable points must be close to x∗, which is a continuous-time
analog to Theorem 4.3 in Perdomo et al. [2020].
5.1 Performative alignment
From the previous analysis, we also identify conditions on the directions of the performative pertur-
bations that are sufficient to show the convergence of Equation (5), the RRM flow, to performative
risk minimizers.
Theorem 2 (Performative alignment). Suppose x∗ is a isolated local performative risk minimizer
and the following holds for all x in a neighborhood of x∗:
|∇x2R(x, x)|2 ≤ 〈−∇x1R(x, x),∇x2R(x, x)〉 (10)
Then x∗ is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the RRM flow, given by Equation (5).
Note that this does not require Assumption 1.
Proof. Let V (x) = PR(x)− PR(x∗). Since x∗ is a locally asymptotically equilibria of the PRM
flow, we have: V (x∗) = 0, V (x) > 0 for x 6= 0, and LfPRV (x) < 0 for x 6= 0. The performative





































Figure 2: Left: The participation rate of group 1 after 600 iterations, based on the initialization of the
weight vector (xθ, xŷ). All of these were initialized with xb = 0. Right: The participation rate of
group 1 across time for different scalings of the perturbation. Small perturbations (corresponding to
smaller values of β) yield continued participation, whereas we fail to provide guarantees for larger
perturbations (corresponding to larger values of β). This plot is shows the average and standard
deviation across 100 trials.
We refer to Equation (10) as the performative alignment condition. This condition states that the
performative perturbation never increases the performative risk, and the convergence of performative
risk minimization is sufficient to guarantee convergence of repeated risk minimization. In other
words, the perturbation is either sufficiently small or pointing in the correct direction to ensure that
PR(·)− PR(x∗) can still act as a Lyapunov function.
Another perspective on performative alignment is to consider the performative risk as a bilinear form
whose arguments are parameterized by x. In particular, consider the decoupled performative risk
R(·, ·). Let `x := `(·, x) and let µx denote the probability distribution associated with D(x). Then,
we can write R(x1, x2) = 〈µx2 , `x1〉. From this perspective, R(·, ·) is a bilinear form in `x and µx.
As such, the performative alignment condition becomes a condition on the way in which ` and µ are
parameterized by x.
6 Numerical results
In this section, we revisit the model introduced in Section 3.1. We again use the parameters: critical
participation rate pc = 0.3, saturation participation rate p = 0.5, and observational noise σ2 = (0.8)2.
The participation rate is initialized to p = 0.3. In lieu of explicitly calculating the expectation, we
drew 100 data points at each iteration and used the empirical distribution to calculate update rules, as
would typically be done in practice. All of the trials, including those in Section 3.1, were conducted
with a constant step-size of αk = 0.1, and with the weight β = 1 for the update rule in Equation (6).
In Figure 2 (Left), we visualize the participation rate of group 1 after 600 iterations, based on the
initialization of the weight vector (xθ, xŷ). (In all cases, the bias term xb was initialized to 0 and
the initial participation was initialized to p = 0.3.) We can see the set of initial conditions in which
group 1 continues to participate in the job application pool.
Next, we consider the effect of scaling the perturbation on the values of p across time. In this model,
we can scale the perturbation by changing the weight parameter β in Equation (6). The bounds
in Theorem 1 depend on the size of the perturbation; the region of attraction is larger for smaller
perturbations. Figure 2 (Right) is conducted with the favored initialization (xθ, xŷ, xb) = (1, 1, 0),
and with initial probability p = 0.3. The visualization shows the average value and standard deviation
across 100 trials. We can see for small perturbations β ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.2}, the probability does not
change significantly across time. For larger perturbations β ∈ {1, 2, 4}, the performative perturbation
can be large enough to push us out of the region of attraction for the nominal dynamics.
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7 Closing remarks
In this paper, we analyzed the problem of performative prediction in settings where multiple isolated
equilibria may be of interest. We analyzed the gradient flow of performative risk minimization, and
identified regions of attraction for various equilibria. We viewed repeated risk minimization flow as
a perturbation of the PRM gradient flow. In particular, we used a Lyapunov function for the PRM
gradient flow to analyze the trajectories of the RRM flow. We found conditions on which RRM
flow will converge to the local PRM minimizers, and conditions on which they will converge to
a neighborhood of PRM minimizers. Stochastic approximation results allowed us to state when
repeated risk minimization will approximate the RRM flow studied.
These results provide a method to analyze the regions of attraction for various equilibria under
repeated risk minimization. In real-world settings with decision-dependent distributions, we expect
many situations where the initialization may have a significant outcome on the trajectories and final
outcomes.
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